Innovations In Cement Manufacturing: Complete Guide & Downlo

The topic of remote access and control in a cement manufacturing facility may initially create apprehension, immediately bringing to mind a pyroprocessing line in operation without any direct control, and Chapter 5.3 of the Innovations in Cement Manufacturing series confronts that apprehension directly: is it far-fetched and impossible to control a pyro-line from a remote site? The chapter argues that the practice, barely conceivable when the text was written, is now reality, and that its development was a natural extension of a long evolution: it was not too long ago when the burner who took his post on the burner floor controlled the pyroprocess system, then came the innovation of the centralized control room, and over the last few years central control rooms have been located out of sight of the kiln, and currently control rooms are being sited farther away from the process than ever. This article expands the original chapter into a complete technical package covering the evolution of control room geography, what remote access and control actually means in operating practice, the technology architecture, the communications, the cybersecurity, the human factors, and the safety engineering that make it viable, and the road that leads toward multi-plant control centers and the increasingly autonomous pyroprocessing line.

The purpose of this article is to give the plant manager, the automation engineer, and the safety professional a complete working picture of remote plant operation: how the control of the kiln migrated from the burner floor to the control room and then out of the plant altogether, what can be controlled remotely and what must stay local, how the distributed control systems, the communication networks, and the visualization platforms connect the remote operator to the process, how security and safety are engineered into the link, and how the experience of the industry, the remote commissioning campaigns, the multi-plant control centers, and the OEM remote service centers, is shaping the next generation of cement plant operation.

1. The Geography of Control: From the Burner Floor to the World

The control of the cement kiln began precisely where the process was: on the burner floor, where the burner, the most experienced man in the plant, stood beside the kiln hood, watched the flame and the material through the observation ports, and manipulated the fuel, the air, the feed, and the kiln speed with the valves and the levers within his reach. The burner’s senses, his eyes for the flame and the shell color, his ears for the roar of the combustion, and his judgement for the state of the charge, were the process instruments, and his walking route along the kiln was the shell scanner of the day.

The first centralization removed the burner from the process: the control rooms of the 1960s and 1970s gathered the instruments, the recorders, and the annunciators into one room, first near the kiln and later in a separate building, and the operator watched the process through the panels and the growing closed-circuit television. The next step removed the control room from the plant’s center: the control rooms moved to the administration buildings, and the teams of operators began to share their attention across the kiln, the mills, and the utilities. The geography of the operation had separated from the geography of the process.

The newest step is the one this chapter examines: the control rooms are sited beyond the fence, the control of multiple plants is consolidated in regional centers and at the suppliers’ service centers, and the remote access to the process data and the authority to act on it are routinely exercised across the globe. The apprehension the chapter names, the image of the pyroprocessing line running without direct control, is addressed by the simple fact that the technology no longer requires the operator to be in sight of the kiln to know its state and to act on it.

The evolution’s logic is clear in hindsight: each step reduced the cost of control room space, consolidated the scarce expertise, and improved the working conditions of the operators, while the technology developed a deeper view of the process than the burner’s senses ever had. The necessary conditions of the evolution, the reliable data, the communications, and the proven control systems, are precisely the subjects of this chapter and of the chapters that surround it in the series.

2. What Remote Control Means in Practice

The first discipline of remote control engineering is to define precisely what is remote and what is not, because the apprehension of the chapter is resolved by that definition. In the mature practice, the operator’s view of the process, the visualization of the trend data, the process graphics, and the video images, is fully remote; the normal process control actions, the setpoint changes, the feed and fuel adjustments, and the start-stop sequences that the control system executes, are performed remotely exactly as they would be from the local control room; and the engineering access, the configuration changes, the software updates, and the diagnostics, is exercised remotely by the automation staff and the equipment suppliers’ service centers.

The functions that remain local are equally well defined: the physical interventions, the maintenance, the cleaning, and the manual operations at the equipment, the emergency stop operations that the process safety philosophy requires to be locally available, and the start-up and shut-down supervision at the site where the personnel and the machine physically interact. The modern remote operation is therefore not an unmanned plant but a plant whose control authority is distant and whose physical presence remains what it has always been, the maintenance and operations crews on the ground.

The modes of remote control are graduated, and the industry distinguishes them carefully. The first mode is remote monitoring: the operators and the management watch the process data, the alarms, and the efficiency figures from anywhere, but the control action remains local. The second is remote supervision: the local control system runs the process autonomously through its advanced control functions, and the remote personnel supervise, adjust setpoints, and intervene on exceptions. The third is full remote control of the continuously operating line: the operators at the remote center operate the line directly through the control system, with the site crew attending to the physical layer, a mode that the multi-plant centers and the supplier service centers practice daily.

Each mode has its own prerequisites and its own safety analysis. The remote monitoring requires only the data communication; the remote supervision requires the agency of the advanced control systems; and the full remote control requires the complete interlock and protection philosophy, the process safety layer, and the communications redundancy that make it possible to guarantee that the process remains protected no matter where its operators sit.

3. The Measurement That Made It Possible: The Control System Layer

The remote operation is only as trustworthy as the control system that stands between the operator and the process, and the modern distributed control system supplies the missing piece of the puzzle, the autonomous execution of the protective and the regulatory functions. The DCS of the modern plant executes the interlocks, the safety trips, the sequence controls, and the regulatory loops continuously and automatically, without any operator action, and its authority over the process is complete: it can start, stop, and protect the equipment on its own logic, independent of the operator’s attention.

The significance of this autonomy for remote control cannot be overstated: the process becomes remotely operable precisely because the control system does not need the operator to keep it safe. The local safety layer, the emergency shutdown systems, the flame safeguards, the pressure and temperature trips, and the bypass buttons at the equipment, remain wired physically at the plant; the control system executes them without reference to the communications link, so that the loss of the remote connection, the worst case of the remote architecture, degrades the operation to the unattended-autonomous mode rather than to a runaway.

The visualization layer completes the operator’s picture. The process graphics of the modern systems present the whole plant on the screens: the pyroprocessing line with its temperatures, flows, and analyses, the mills with their loads and their fineness, the silos with their levels, and the auxiliary systems with their energies, all updated in seconds from the control system’s database. The alarm lists, the event logs, and the operator actions are recorded with their timestamps, so the remote operator and the site crew share one authoritative record of what happened and what was done.

The historian, the data warehouse that archives the process data at the second or the minute level, is the fourth element of the layer. The historian gives the remote analyst the complete history of the process: the trend of every variable, the signature of every event, and the basis of every investigation. The modern practice of remote analysis, the weekly reviews of the process performance, the investigation of the excursions, and the tuning of the loops, is conducted almost entirely against the historian’s record, and the remote access to the historian is the daily working tool of the plant’s support network, the supplier engineers, and the benchmarks of the group.

4. The Communications Infrastructure

Between the plant and the remote operator lies the communications network, and its engineering is the visible craft of remote operation. The plant’s control system LAN carries the process data between the controllers, the servers, and the operator stations within the plant; the perimeter of that LAN is guarded by the network security architecture described in the next section; and the connection to the outside world runs through the protected gateway to the internet service provider links, the fiber connections, the cellular networks, or the satellite links that serve the remote sites.

The performance requirements of the communication are defined by the process needs. The remote operator requires the process data at a refresh rate that supports the safe supervision, in practice the remote stations perform best when the screen data refreshes within a few seconds, and the control actions must travel to the plant within the response time that the interlock philosophy accepts; the modern systems achieve this comfortably over the high-bandwidth links, while the low-bandwidth sites are served by the data compression and by the priority schemes that send the alarms and the critical variables ahead of the routine data.

The redundancy of the communication is the discipline that matches the redundancy of the control system. The remote architectures of the serious installations maintain two independent paths to the plant, the primary link and the backup link on a different carrier or technology, with automatic failover in the plant’s gateway; and the monitoring of the link quality, the latency, and the packet loss is part of the network management, so that the degradation of the communication is detected and repaired before it threatens the visibility of the process.

The unification of the plant’s communication suffers from the legacy of the stepwise expansion: the modern plants run converged networks in which the control system data, the video surveillance streams, the telephony, and the office traffic share the routed infrastructure, separated by the virtual networks and the firewalls. The convergence has brought the economies of one infrastructure and one operations team, at the price of the sharper security engineering that the next section describes, and the plants are governed by the rule that the control system traffic, the only traffic that can move the process, is segregated from everything that cannot.

5. Cybersecurity: The Fortress Around the Link

The remote connection to the process is an invitation that the security architecture must decline, and the cybersecurity of the remote plant operation has become one of the most serious engineering subjects of the industry. The principle of the defense in depth governs the architecture: the plant network is protected by multiple independent layers, the perimeter firewall at the internet gateway, the DMZ that hosts the services exposed to the outside, the internal firewalls between the office and the control networks, and the station-level protections, so that the breach of any single layer does not expose the process.

The control system network itself is the innermost court of the castle, and its discipline is absolute. The process controllers and the operator stations communicate only through the control system protocols on their own network segments; the connection from the control network to the rest of the world passes through the industrial firewalls that filter the traffic to the process protocols; and the remote access connections are established only through the hardened gateways with the individual authentication, the two-factor authentication of the remote users, and the full audit trail of every remote session. The industrial security standards of today, exemplified by the IEC 62443 series, have given the cement industry a common language for exactly this architecture.

The threat model of the cement plant is the model of every industrial facility at the edge of a hostile internet: the direct attacks on the exposed services, the malware that enters through the office mail and the USB devices, the ransomware that encrypts the business records, and the insider threats of the disaffected and the careless. The defense in depth answers each: the exposure is minimized by design, the malware is stopped at the office and the perimeter, the backups of the control configuration are maintained off-line, and the access rights of the personnel are the smallest that their duties allow, with the review of the rights on the schedule that the audits enforce.

The security of the remote chain is finally a people discipline as much as a machine discipline: the remote access accounts are issued individually and revoked on departure, the passwords are governed by the plant’s policy and the two-factor tokens, and the system is tested, the vulnerability scans, the penetration tests, and the incident response drills, on the schedule that the insurance policies and the corporate standards demand. The plants that treat cybersecurity as a permanent budget line rather than a one-time project are the plants whose remote operations survive the hostile internet that they are part of.

6. Remote Service and Support: The Supplier at the Operator’s Side

The most widespread and mature use of remote access is not the remote operating mode but the remote service model: the equipment suppliers, the automation vendors, and the engineering groups connect to the plants to commission, to optimize, and to support the equipment they sold. The remote commissioning of the modern lines is an established practice: the supplier’s engineers, instead of traveling to the site, connect through the remote access to the plant’s engineering station, download the configurations, perform the loop checks, and direct the site crew through the start-up, with the site’s personnel providing the physical hands and the supplier’s experts providing the knowledge.

The remote optimization service is the natural extension: the supplier’s process experts review the plant’s historian data, the kiln profiles, the mill performances, and the energy figures, and they recommend and implement the adjustments, the tuning of the control loops, the settings of the advanced control, and the operational practices, in continuous campaigns that the plant’s own staff could not sustain with the same depth. The big groups operate service centers that watch the performance of entire fleets of plants, benchmark them against each other, and step in with the analyses when a line underperforms its class.

The remote diagnostics are the most frequent use of all: when the plant faces an excursion, an alarm, or a failure that its own staff cannot immediately explain, the supplier’s engineers connect, read the historian and the diagnostics, compare the behavior with their knowledge base of similar events, and guide the recovery. The value of this mode is measured in the difference between the organized investigation and the improvised one: the remote specialist sees the data within minutes of the call, and the recovery actions are taken on the evidence, not on the speculation.

The service model has transformed the economics of technical support: the travel costs have collapsed, the specialists’ time is used where the problems are, and the small plants, which could never afford a resident team of specialists, receive the same depth of support as the large ones. The chapter’s message is that remote access, far from being a threat to the local staff, has multiplied their capability: the local crew keeps its authority over the physical layer, and the remote network of specialists stands behind it, connected in minutes whenever the situation demands.

7. Multi-Plant Control Centers and Centralized Operation

The consolidation of plant operation into multi-plant control centers is the industry’s boldest application of the chapter’s technology. The mult-plant center operates several lines, sometimes plants in different countries, from one room: each line appears on its own screens and panels, the operators are assigned by the load and the complexity, and the common support resources, the process analysts, the maintenance planners, and the management, serve the entire fleet from one location. The economy of the practice is the economy of the scarce resource: the experienced kiln operators and the automation specialists, the people who make the difference in the plant’s performance, are concentrated where they can serve the largest number of lines.

The center’s operating discipline is the classic discipline of the control room, scaled: the operator’s span of attention is defined per line, the alarm management is centralized so that the center’s screens are not flooded, the shift turnover is structured across the lines and the time zones, and the communication protocols between the center and the site crews are formalized, because the center’s operator who changes a setpoint must know that the maintenance crew at the site is working on the very motor that the setpoint affects.

The experience of the multi-plant centers has demonstrated both the advantages and the hazards of the practice. The advantages are documented in the performance data: the best-practice operation of the expert center, applied across the fleet, lifts the average line performance toward the level of the best line, in stability, in fuel consumption, and in availability. The hazards are equally documented: the loss of the local knowledge of the equipment and the site, the operator fatigue of the concentrated attention, and the communication failures between the center and the site, whose consequences the discipline must design against from the start.

The future of the practice is the further consolidation of the control authority with the automation: as the advanced control and the expert systems of the border chapters take over more of the continuous operation, the center’s operator role shifts toward the supervision of the automated operation and the handling of the exceptions, and the center becomes a command post for a fleet of increasingly autonomous lines rather than a room of manual operators.

8. Human Factors of the Remote Operator

The remote operator works in a different sensory world from the burner of the chapter’s opening, and the human factors engineering of that world is a serious discipline, because the attention and the decisions of the operator remain the last line of defence in the process. The remote operator sees the process through the screens: the graphics, the trends, and the video, and the design of that view, its clarity, its organization, and its honesty, decides the quality of the supervision that the operator can provide.

The first human factor is the situation awareness: the operator must hold a mental model of the process state that is accurate even when the physical cues of the plant are absent. The practice compensates with the structured views: the overview displays that show the whole line at a glance, the alarms that are filtered and prioritized so that the flood does not bury the important, and the video cameras that give the operator the eyes at the critical points, the kiln nose, the cooler, the packers, and the chutes, that the burner once had from the floor.

The second factor is the alertness and the workload. The remote operation concentrates the attention on the screens for the full shift, and the fatigue of that attention is a real phenomenon, so the modern practice schedules the shifts with the breaks, rotates the operators between the active supervision and the monitoring duty, and places the automation between the operator and the routine so that the operator’s attention is reserved for the exceptions. The alarm philosophy, the prioritization, the suppression of the standing and the nuisance alarms, and the clear presentation of the actionable alarms, is the instrument of that reservation.

The third factor is the communication with the site. The remote center and the local crews must act in concert, and the discipline of that concert, the radio and the telephone protocols, the work-permit system that informs the center of every physical intervention, and the shared event log that records both the remote actions and the local ones, is what makes the two-location team operate as one. The incidents of the remote era, the few that have occurred, have been traced repeatedly to the communication failures between the distant operators and the local crews, and the mature practice treats that communication as a designed system, not as an afterthought.

9. Safety Engineering of the Remote Architecture

The safety analysis of the remote architecture starts from the worst case and works backward: what happens if the remote connection fails, if the center loses power, if the network is attacked, or if the operator at the center becomes unaware of the process? The answer of the engineering is the same in every direction: the process must fall back to a state that is safe without the remote operator, which is exactly the state the process occupies when the control system runs its automatic functions with the local safety system armed.

The layered design implements this answer. The process safety instruments, the trips, the interlocks, and the safety shutdowns, are wired at the plant and execute independently of the communications; the control system’s automatic sequences, the start and stop logic, and the regulatory control, run on the plant controllers that do not depend on the remote links; and the local facilities, the emergency stop circuits, the manual bypasses, and the site crew, provide the last layer of physical authority. The loss of the remote link, or of the center, degrades the operation to the local-autonomous mode, which is a normal operating mode of the plant, not an emergency state.

The communication failure itself is engineered with the same care: the remote stations detect the loss of the link instantly, the control actions in flight are completed by the plant’s controllers under their own protection logic, the alarms of the lost connection reach both the center and the site crews, and the process continues or shuts down according to the designed fallback, never according to the operator’s improvisation. The design goal is that no failure of the remote layer, of the hardware, the software, the network, or the people, can put the process into a state that the local systems do not already guard.

The safety case of the remote operation is documented like every safety case: the hazard analysis lists the failures and the consequences, the engineering measures answer each, and the verification, the tests, the drills, and the audits, demonstrate that the measures work. The authorities and the insurers increasingly ask for exactly this documentation, and the plants that operate remotely without it are operating on borrowed trust, while the plants with the complete safety case can demonstrate to anyone that the remote control of the pyroprocessing line is engineered, and not hoped, to be safe.

10. Remote Operation in Practice: A Day in the Remote Operating Mode

The operating practice of the remote mode is best understood through its daily routine. The shift begins at the remote center with the handover from the previous shift: the state of each line, the recent events, the active orders, and the maintenance in progress are reviewed against the historians and the logs; the operators take their stations, and the morning supervision of the lines begins, with the kiln profile, the cooler performance, the mill loads, and the energy figures reviewed against the targets of the day.

Through the shift, the pattern of the day unfolds. The operators follow the alarms and the trends, adjusting the setpoints of the loops that the advanced control does not own; the planned changes, the product switches of the mills, and the silo operations, are executed as sequences with the coordination of the site crews, who are informed by the shared communications; and the exceptions, the excursions, the trips, and the failures, are handled through the structured response: the alarm analysis, the intervention, the notification of the site, and the documentation of the event.

The site crews work to the center’s orchestration: the maintenance teams carry out the planned work under the permits, the sampling and the laboratory teams follow the quality schedules, and the physical operations, the crusher moves, the truck loadings, and the deliveries, proceed as they always have, with the center’s operators watching the parts of the process that the site cannot see. The relationship is that of the ship’s bridge and the engine room: the bridge commands, the engine room executes, and the two communicate on the procedure that both have drilled.

The end of the shift returns the discipline to the documentation: the handover notes, the log entries, and the data records are completed, and the next shift takes over the watch. The notable fact of this routine is its ordinariness: the remote operation has become the normal operation, and the space between the operator and the kiln, once measured in the burner’s steps on the floor, is now measured in kilometers, without any change in the authority, the safety, or the quality of the process.

11. The Road Ahead: Autonomy and the Future Control Room

The direction of the evolution that the chapter traces, from the burner floor toward the remote center, is the direction toward the increasing autonomy of the process itself. The advanced control systems of the industry maintain the kiln, the cooler, and the mills on their targets for the long stretches between interventions; the machine learning and the model-based analytics of the newest systems detect the developing trends, the refractory wear, the separator drift, and the mill degradation, before the operators would; and the maintenance systems schedule their own attention on the condition data. The operator’s role moves, step by step, from the handler of the process to the supervisor of the systems that handle it.

The future control room, the direction the chapter’s horizon points to, will supervise fleets of lines whose normal operation is automatic: the operators will manage the exceptions, the starts and stops, the campaigns, and the investigations, from anywhere, and the site crews will be the physical service layer of an intelligent process network. The suppliers already operate the model at the service centers, and the advanced plants are converging toward it, so that the question the chapter poses, is remote control of a pyro-line impossible, has been answered by the industry’s demonstration in the affirmative, with the qualification that the remote line is controlled far better, and far more safely, than the burner on the floor ever controlled it.

The table below summarizes the evolution of control geography that the chapter documents, with the characteristics of each stage:

Era	Operator location	Process view	Control actions	Limits
Classical plants	Burner floor	Direct senses, ports	Manual valves and levers	One person, one view, one kiln
1960s–1980s	Local control room	Panels, recorders, CCTV	From the panel	Operator must be in the plant
1990s–2000s	Central control room, plant building	DCS graphics, historians	From the DCS	Control authority in the plant
2000s–2010s	Off-plant control room, group centers	Remote graphics, video	Remote setpoints, sequences	Communications and security
Present and future	Multi-plant centers, mobile	Digital twin, analytics, video AI	Autonomous systems, exception handling	Human factors, cybersecurity

The table’s last row states the frontier honestly: the technical limits of remote control have been solved, and the current limits are the human factors of the concentrated attention, the cybersecurity of the connected plant, and the organizational design of the two-location operation, all of which are engineering problems in their own right, and all of which the industry is actively working.

12. Organizational and Management Dimensions

The remote operation transforms the organization of the plant as much as its technology. The staffing of the remote center, the skills of its operators, and the career paths of the site crews are designed intentionally: the center’s operators are trained in the multiple lines and the advanced control, while the site crews develop the mechanical and the process depth of the physical layer, and the two populations are rotated and cross-trained so that each understands the other’s world. The plant’s training programs, the operator training simulators that many plants run, prepare the operators for the remote and the autonomous modes, and the certification of the remote operators is a documented discipline.

The management of the remote operations defines new key performance indicators: the response times of the center, the alarm analysis quality, the remote availability of the lines, and the communication discipline between the center and the sites, in addition to the traditional production, quality, and energy figures. The reporting structure, the responsibility for the process results, and the accountability for the events are clarified in the operating agreements that the multi-plant operations establish, because the distance dissolves the informal accountability that the face-to-face plant once provided.

The knowledge management of the organization is both challenged and enriched by the remote network: the informal knowledge of the veterans, once confined to their plants, is being converted into the documented practices, the playbooks, the procedures, and the training materials that the remote centers apply across the fleet, while the historian data of all the lines feeds the analytics that the organization uses for its continuous improvement. The chapter’s perspective is that the remote revolution is, at its heart, a knowledge revolution: the process expertise of the industry, once distributed in the heads of the operators, is being concentrated, documented, and applied wherever it is needed.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is it really safe to operate a kiln line remotely?

Yes, under the layered architecture that the mature practice uses: the safety trips, interlocks, and protective systems remain wired locally at the plant and act independently of any remote link, the control system’s automatic functions run on the plant controllers, and the loss of the remote connection falls back to the local-autonomous mode rather than to an unguarded state. Remote operation is safe exactly to the degree that the local safety layer is complete, and that is what the safety case demonstrates.

What can actually be controlled from a remote location?

The same functions the operator executes from a local control room: setpoint changes, feed and fuel adjustments, sequence starts and stops, and supervision through the process graphics, trends, and video. What remains local is the physical layer, the maintenance, the cleaning, the manual operations, the local emergency stops, and the site crews that interact with the machinery.

How did the control of the kiln evolve historically?

From the burner on the kiln floor, whose senses were the instruments, to the panel control rooms of the 1960s, to the central control rooms in the plant buildings of the DCS era, and then beyond the fence: control rooms moved out of sight of the kiln, and the remote service centers and multi-plant control rooms now operate lines across distances of thousands of kilometers.

What happens if the remote connection fails during operation?

The design assumes the failure: the controllers keep running their automatic and protective functions locally, the remote stations alarm the loss of connection, and the operation continues in the autonomous-local mode or shuts down according to the designed fallback. The goal of the engineering is that no communication failure can place the process in a state the local systems do not already guard.

How is the remote link protected against cyberattacks?

By defense in depth: perimeter firewalls, a DMZ for the exposed services, segregation between the office and the control networks, individual and two-factor authentication for every remote session, audit trails of all remote activity, minimized access rights, off-line backups of the configurations, and regular vulnerability scans and penetration tests, all in accordance with the industrial security standards such as IEC 62443.

Does remote control eliminate the need for site staff?

No, it redefines their role. The site crews remain essential for all physical work, maintenance, cleaning, sampling, and local interventions, while the remote operators and the service specialists provide the supervision, the expertise, and the analysis. The two-location team, the bridge and the engine room, operates as one organization through designed communication protocols.

Final Summary

Chapter 5.3 of Innovations in Cement Manufacturing confronts the question of remote access and control of the cement plant, and this article has expanded the chapter into a complete technical package. The article established the evolution of control geography from the burner floor through the centralized control rooms to the remote centers, defined precisely what the remote operation controls and what remains local, and developed the control system and visualization layer that makes the remote view of the process trustworthy.

The technical core covered the communications infrastructure and the cybersecurity architecture that protect the remote link, the remote service and support models of the suppliers, and the multi-plant control centers through which the industry consolidates its expertise. The operational and human dimensions treated the human factors of the remote operator, the safety engineering of the remote architecture, the daily practice of the remote operating mode, and the organizational design of the two-location team, and the article closed with the road toward the increasingly autonomous operation of the future.

The conclusion of the chapter is that the apprehension that opens it, the image of the pyroprocessing line running without any direct control, has been answered by engineering: the modern line runs not without control but with control of a higher order, split between the autonomous local systems that protect it and the distant operators and specialists who understand and direct it. The evolution from the burner’s floor to the remote center is one of the clearest threads of the innovations series, and the industry’s steady advance along it shows no sign of stopping.

This file is part of the Complete Cement Technical Package (931 files) available from cementequipment.org. Respective rights holders; library copy for the licensed single user.